From c048a2a6d7c25e4665d36bef7cb92df30f9700f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: chenjintao_ii Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 18:59:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] translating by chenjintao --- sources/E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sources/E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features.md b/sources/E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features.md index 153b1bbdd3..24dd7bf110 100644 --- a/sources/E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features.md +++ b/sources/E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features.md @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features +[翻译 by chenjintao]E-Mail App Geary Gets New Look, New Features ================================================================================ ![](http://www.omgubuntu.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Screen-Shot-2013-10-04-at-14.30.29.png) *All New Look: Geary 0.4 Is Now Available to Download* @@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ via: http://www.omgubuntu.co.uk/2013/10/geary-0-4-released-with-new-look-new-fea [1]:http://www.omgubuntu.co.uk/2013/10/shotwell-0-15-released-fixes-improvements [2]:http://www.omgubuntu.co.uk/2013/04/geary-fundraiser-fails-at-half-way-mark [3]:https://launchpad.net/~yorba/+archive/ppa -[4]:apt://geary \ No newline at end of file +[4]:apt://geary From 7af1142b7e63538645f122f8a0690d846d2517fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wxy Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 20:27:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] =?UTF-8?q?=E9=80=89=E9=A2=9820131012?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- sources/On Security Backdoors.md | 42 ++++++++++++++++ ...nSSL Bug- Backdoor or Security Accident.md | 49 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+) create mode 100644 sources/On Security Backdoors.md create mode 100644 sources/The Debian OpenSSL Bug- Backdoor or Security Accident.md diff --git a/sources/On Security Backdoors.md b/sources/On Security Backdoors.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3df8bde9e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/sources/On Security Backdoors.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +On Security Backdoors +===================== + +I [wrote][1] Monday about revelations that the NSA might have been inserting backdoors into security standards. Today I want to talk through two cases where the NSA has been accused of backdooring standards, and use these cases to differentiate between two types of backdoors. + +The first case concerns a NIST standard, [SP 800-90A][2], which specifies a type of PseudoRandom Generator (PRG). A PRG is a computation that takes a small number of random/unpredictable bits and “stretches” them to get a larger number of unpredictable bits. PRGs are essential to cryptography, serving as the source for most of the secret keys that are used. If you can “break” somebody’s PRG, you can predict which secret keys they will use, thereby allowing you to defeat their crypto. + +The standard gave a choice of several core algorithms to choose from. One of them uses a mathematical construct called an Elliptic Curve (EC) which I won’t try to explain in this space. This algorithm uses two “public parameters” called P and Q, which are points on the EC. P and Q are public, with specific values written into the standard. + +Cryptographers believed that if you picked P and Q randomly, the PRG would be secure. But in 2006 two private-sector cryptographers figured out that there is a way to pick P and Q so they have a special relationship to each other. An “outsider” wouldn’t be able to tell that the special relationship existed, but if you knew the “secret key” that described the relationship between P and Q, then you could easily defeat the security of the PRG. + +At this point, several facts become suddenly interesting. First, NSA people seemed very intent on including this specific algorithm in the standard despite its slow performance. Second, NSA was suggesting specific values of P and Q. Third, NSA was not explaining how those particular P and Q values had been chosen. Interesting, no? + +All of this could have been addressed by having some kind of public procedure by which new, random P and Q values would be chosen. But that didn’t happen. + +Yesterday NIST [re-opened][3] SP 800-90A for public comment. + +The second example was explained by John Gilmore. John described his observations from the IPSEC standards process. IPSEC was meant as a foundational security technology, providing crypto for confidentiality and integrity of individual IP packets on the Internet. A successful and widely deployed IPSEC would have been a game-changer for Internet security, putting lots of traffic under cryptographic protection. + +John says that NSA people and their allies worked consistently to make the standard less secure, more complicated, less efficient, and harder to implement securely. He didn’t see a smoking-gun attempt to introduce a backdoor, but what he describes is a consistent effort to undermine the effectiveness of the standard. And indeed, IPSEC has not had anything like the impact one might have expected. + +These examples shows us two different kinds of backdoors. In the first PRG case, the NSA was accused of trying to create a backdoor that only it could use, because only it knew the secret key relating P to Q. In the second IPSEC case, the accusation was that the NSA was weakening users’ security against all attackers—the NSA would have easier access to your data, but so would all sorts of other people. + +To be sure, even a private backdoor might not stay private. If there is a magic secret key that lets the NSA spy on everyone, that key might be misused or it might leak. So the line between an NSA-only backdoor and an open backdoor is always a bit blurry. + +Still, it seems to me that the two types of backdoors call for different policy debates. It’s one thing to secretly give the NSA easier access to everyone’s data. It’s another thing to give everyone easier access. The latter is worse. +We need to look as well at how a backdoor might be created. In the PRG example, the backdoor would have required the NSA to slip a subtle cryptographic weakness past the crypto experts working on a standard. In the IPSEC example, creating the weakness would seem to require coordinated public activity in the standards body over time, and the individual steps would surely be noticed even if nobody spotted a pattern. + +But one has to wonder whether these examples really were NSA attempts to undermine security, or whether they’re just false alarms. We can’t be sure. As long as the NSA has a license to undermine security standards, we’ll have to be suspicious of any standard in which they participate. + +--- + +via: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/on-security-backdoors/ + +本文由 [LCTT](https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject) 原创翻译，[Linux中国](http://linux.cn/) 荣誉推出 + +译者：[译者ID](https://github.com/译者ID) 校对：[校对者ID](https://github.com/校对者ID) + + +[1]:https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/nsa-apparently-undermining-standards-security-confidence/ +[2]:http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-90/draft_sp800_90a_rev1.pdf +[3]:http://www.nist.gov/director/cybersecuritystatement-091013.cfm diff --git a/sources/The Debian OpenSSL Bug- Backdoor or Security Accident.md b/sources/The Debian OpenSSL Bug- Backdoor or Security Accident.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7b3f4c9edd --- /dev/null +++ b/sources/The Debian OpenSSL Bug- Backdoor or Security Accident.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +The Debian OpenSSL Bug: Backdoor or Security Accident? +====================================================== + +On Monday, Ed wrote about [Software Transparency][1], the idea that software is more resistant to intentional backdoors (and unintentional security vulnerabilities) if the process used to create it is transparent. Elements of software transparency include the availability of source code and the ability to read or contribute to a project’s issue tracker or internal developer discussion. He mentioned a case that I want to discuss in detail: in 2008, the Debian Project (a popular Linux distribution used for many web servers) [announced][2] that the pseudorandom number generator in Debian’s version of [OpenSSL][3] was broken and insecure. + +First, some background: A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is a program F that, given a short random seed s, gives you a long stream of bits F(s) which appear to be random. If you and I put in the same seed s, we’ll get the same stream of bits. But if I choose s at random and don’t tell you what it is, you can’t predict F(s) at all—as far as you’re concerned, F(s) might as well be random. The OpenSSL PRNG tries to grab some unpredictable information (“entropy”) from the system, such as the current process ID, the contents of some memory that are likely to be different (for example, uninitialized memory which is or might be controlled by other processes) and so on, and turns these into the seed s. Then it gives back the random stream F(s). + +In 2006, in order to [fix warnings][4] spit out by [a tool][5] that can help find memory access bugs in software, one of the Debian maintainers [decided to comment][6] [out two lines of code][7] in the OpenSSL PRNG. It turns out that these lines were important: they were responsible for grabbing almost all of the unpredictable entropy that became the seed for the OpenSSL PRNG. Without them, the PRNG only had 32,767 choices for s, so there were only that many possible choices for F(s). + +And so programs that relied on the OpenSSL random number generator weren’t seeing nearly as much randomness as they thought they were. One such program generates the cryptographic keys used for SSL (secure web browsing) and SSH (secure remote login). Critically, these keys have to be random: if you can guess what my secret key is, you can break into anything I protect using that key. That means you have the ability to read encrypted traffic, [log into remote servers[8], [or to make forged messages appear authentic][9]. Because the vulnerability had first been introduced in late 2006, the bug also [made its way into Ubuntu][10] (another popular Linux distribution widely used for web servers). All told, the bug affected thousands of servers and [persisted for a long time][11] because patching the affected servers was not enough to fix the problem—you also had to replace any predictable weak keys you had made while the vulnerability was present. + +As an aside, the problem of finding entropy to feed pseudorandom number generators is [famously][12] [hard][13]. Indeed, it’s still a [big challenge][14] to get right even today. Errors in randomness are hard to detect, because if you just eyeball the output, it will look random-ish and will change each time you run the program. Weak randomness can be very hard to spot, but it can render the cryptography in a (seemingly) secure system useless. Still, the Debian bug was obvious enough that it inspired a [lot of ridicule][15] [in the security community][16] once it was discovered. + +So was this problem a backdoor, purposefully introduced? It seems unlikely. The maintainer who made the change, [Kurt Roeckx][17], was later [made Secretary of the Debian Project][18], suggesting that he’s a real and trustworthy person and probably not a fake identity made up by the NSA to insert a vulnerability. The Debian Project is famous for requiring significant effort to reach the inner circle. And in this case, the mistake itself was not completely damning—a [cascade of failures][19] made the vulnerability possible and contributed to its severity. + +But the vulnerability did happen in a transparent setting. Everything that was done was done in public. And yet the vulnerability still got introduced and wasn’t noticed for a long time. That’s in part because all the transparency made for a lot of noise, so the people to whom the vulnerability would have been obvious weren’t paying attention. But it’s also because the vulnerability was subtle and the system wasn’t designed to make the impact of the change obvious to a casual observer. + +Does that mean that software transparency doesn’t help? I don’t think so—lots of people agree that transparent software is more secure than non-transparent software. But that doesn’t mean failures can’t still happen or that we should be less vigilant just because lots of other people can see what’s going on. + +At the very least, transparency lets us look back, years later, and figure out what caused the bug—in this case, engineering error and not deliberate sabotage. + +--- + +via: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/kroll/software-transparency-debian-openssl-bug/ + +本文由 [LCTT](https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject) 原创翻译，[Linux中国](http://linux.cn/) 荣誉推出 + +译者：[译者ID](https://github.com/译者ID) 校对：[校对者ID](https://github.com/校对者ID) + + +[1]:https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/software-transparency/ +[2]:http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571 +[3]:https://www.openssl.org/ +[4]:http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=363516 +[5]:http://valgrind.org/ +[6]:http://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=114651085826293&w=2 +[7]:http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-openssl/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c?rev=141&view=diff&r1=141&r2=140&p1=openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c&p2=/openssl/trunk/rand/md_rand.c +[8]:http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5622/ +[9]:http://plog.sesse.net/blog/tech/2008-05-14-17-21_some_maths.html +[10]:http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-612-1/ +[11]:http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/debiankey.pdf +[12]:http://xkcd.com/221/ +[13]:http://dilbert.com/strips/comic/2001-10-25/ +[14]:https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf +[15]:http://www.xkcd.com/424/ +[16]:http://www.links.org/?p=327 +[17]:http://www.roeckx.be/journal/ +[18]:http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2009/02/msg00009.html +[19]:http://research.swtch.com/openssl From df4a9619320a4ff183473363d03ed057fcf55364 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: l3b2w1 Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 21:42:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Delete Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md --- ...an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md | 58 ------------------- 1 file changed, 58 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 sources/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md diff --git a/sources/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md b/sources/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md deleted file mode 100644 index f232c9855f..0000000000 --- a/sources/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -Open source is brutal: an interview with Google's Chris DiBona -============================================================== - -![img](https://opensource.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/image-full-size/images/law/LAW_imaginationcrucial.png) - -Image by opensource.com - -Chris DiBona is the Director of Open Source for Google. He is also one of the great champions of open source, dating back to when he first fell in love with Linux at his university. - -At the All Things Open conference this year, Chris will give an update on Google's current open source software activities and a retrospective, of sorts, on the origins and state of Android. - -I caught up with him to discuss his favourite Linux distribution, the brutal nature of open source, and his view of Google's responsibilities as an industry leader. - -Read more in this interview. - -What's something we don't know about your path to Google and working with open source? - -> I first used Linux while I was at school, as we needed to write some client/server stuff for the operating systems class I was taking. Fortuitously for me, the Sun workstation lab was crowded, very hot due to poor ventilation, smelly (coder odor), and the terminals were very very slow. I figured, what the heck, let's give this Linux thing a shot on a 486-16 I had lying around at home. Best decision ever. I fell in love with the Linux OS. It was so great, fast, and feature-full even back then compared to other unixes. I got an A in the OS class, too. - -A question almost as dangerous as asking about your favourite sports team; what's your favourite Linux distribution? - -> Ha! A flip answer would be Android as that's the device with a Linux kernel that I use more than anything else by two orders of magnitude, though most people don't consider it a distribution in the common way we talk about them. I'm typing the reply to this question on Chrome running on a Ubuntu/Debian derivative. I'm running a Debian instance on Google compute engine and I have a Fedora machine at home that I use from time to time. I carry a Chomebook around for most of my presentations and feel it's probably the most secure machine I own. - -> Favorite though? Android. - -You spent a long time working with open source and Linux before moving to Google in 2004. What made you want to work with Google? - -> When I decided to return to full time work after a brief period consulting, Google's offer was the strongest and the most interesting to me. The idea of being able to be Google's 'open source person' and to build the effort from scratch was deeply appealing to me. I also felt that Google was (and is) still doing really interesting computer science and that appealed to me in ways that the other offers didn't. - -Not only do you mentor and consult on a variety of different projects, you're also involved with Google Ventures, helping to fund startups, so what is it that you look for in a project? What makes you say: "Yes, I want to help you"? - -> Well, honestly, I am mostly looking for it to be interesting. For Google Ventures, I am not really in the deal flow so much as I'm brought in on open source issues (which are interesting and legion). - -In an interview a few years ago you said, "Google works with the open source community. Sponsorship implies stewardship, and that's a pretty serious thing." Does Google hope to avoid stewardship in the communities it's involved in? Are the two inextricably linked? - -> I think so. I would rather Google engineers and non-google open source engineers see each other as peers in computer science. We do realize that our broad funding of open source projects can imply stewardship like control of projects, but you know, that's how it goes even if that sort of thing doesn't really correlate. - -You once called open source “brutal”. What did you mean by that? - -> Well, I think I was asked why open source works and when you think about how software engineering management works in industry, it shouldn't. Disparate, distributed, non-homogenous teams are extremely difficult to run in a company, but in open source it creates some world-class terrific software. Why is that? - -> I think that it is because open source projects are able to only work with the productive people and ignore everyone else. That behavior can come across as very harsh or exclusionary, and that's because it is that: brutally harsh and exclusionary of anyone who isn't contributing. - -> This is why project forking is so important. If a person is rejected from a project for whatever reason, they can fork and take the project in a new direction, and if their ideas and execution is superior to the primary project, that fork becomes the new reality and those people that rejected that developer are now the rejected. - -> So, I guess what I'm saying is that survival of the fittest as practiced in the open source world is a pretty brutal mechanism, but it works very very well for producing quality software. Boy is it hard on newcomers though... - -Fourteen years ago, you edited an O'Reilly book about open source. Has the landscape of open source changed much in those years? Do you think open source will overtake the proprietary model in the future? - -> The landscape has changed a bit, with the notable demographic difference being that we've seen a growth in the number of people in companies working on open source, and I perceive a slight decline in open source participation in the academy, which I blame on the tech-transfer/bayh-dole patenting process being a real barrier to code licensing. Similarly, some open source coming out of universities and companies simply isn't open source enough as there is a fair amount of side dealing going around on around patents. I'm tempted to say that if it isn't a patent granting license, you should be suspicious, but that's probably a bit extreme a position to take at this time. - ---- - -via: https://opensource.com/business/13/10/interview-chris-dibona - -本文由 [LCTT](https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject) 原创翻译，[Linux中国](http://linux.cn/) 荣誉推出 - -译者：[译者ID](https://github.com/译者ID) 校对：[校对者ID](https://github.com/校对者ID) \ No newline at end of file From e7dc560ab19ce72f80fba6cbeb5e3bd23abf46d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: l3b2w1 Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 21:52:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Create Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md --- ...an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+) create mode 100644 translated/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md diff --git a/translated/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md b/translated/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3fe984a782 --- /dev/null +++ b/translated/Open source is brutal- an interview with Google's Chris DiBona.md @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +开源是冷酷无情的：谷歌Chris DiBona访谈 + +============================================================== + +![img](https://opensource.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/image-full-size/images/law/LAW_imaginationcrucial.png) + +Chris DiBona是谷歌开源执行总监。他也是开源界杰出的领军人物，对开源的关注可以追溯到他的大学时期，对Linux可谓一见钟情。 + +在今年的 ”一切皆开源“ 大会上，Chris 将会介绍谷歌开源软件事业的各个方面，包括其进展、前景等，还有Android的起源和现况。 + +我去见他，和他一起讨论他最喜欢的linux发行版，开源的无情法则，以及他对谷歌作为业界领袖应有的责任的看法。 + +以下是访谈详情。 + +问：对于你加入谷歌并且在开源部门展开工作，有那些方面是我们所不知道的？ + +答： + 第一次使用linux是在上学的时候，由于当时选修了操作系统课程，为此，我打算写一些 有关客户端/服务器 的东西。很幸运， +那时候Sun工作站实验室很热闹，因为公开探讨问题的风气使然，编码味十足，但是使用的终端跑得相当慢。我在想，瓶颈在哪， +不妨就用一直都摆放在家里的一台486-16上试试这个linux到底怎么样。相当棒的决定。从此我喜欢上了linux系统。linux太棒了， +跑得很快，而且与其他unix系统相比，功能齐全。OS这门课，我也得了A。 + +问：下面这个问题跟询问你最喜欢的球队一样很危险；你最喜欢哪个linux发行版？ + +答： + 哈！我很想说是Android，因为Android是基于linux内核的，而我对linux内核的使用频度远远超过其他一些东西。尽管通常情况 +下讨论Android时，多数人都不把它当做一个发行版。我的回答同样适用于在Ubuntu/Debian衍生版本上运行的Chrome浏览器，如果有 +人针对Chrome这样问的话。我在谷歌计算引擎上运行的是Debian，在家里则经常用Fedora。出席公共场合的时候，大多数情况下我携 +带Chomebook, 感觉用它最安全。 + 最喜欢的？ Android。 + +问：2004年加入谷歌之前，你在开源和linux领域投入了许多时间，是什么原因促使你加入谷歌? + +答： + 从事咨询方面的工作一段简短的时间之后，当我决定开始全职工作，谷歌的offer对我来说最富有吸引力。 成为谷歌开源人、白 + 手起家开始创业的想法深深地打动了我。我自己也认为谷歌过去，包括现在仍然在做计算机科学方面 有意思的东西，而且以各 + 种方式吸引着我，这些不是其他offer所具有的。 + +问：你不但指导各种项目的开发，而且也参与了Google Ventures，为该项目的启动注资，那么你在一个项目中想要寻找什么，是什 +么让你说出这样的话：”是的，我就是想帮你” ? + +答： + 呃，坦白说，我希望它是令人感兴趣的。对于Google Ventures，我并不需要过多的深入其中， 开源问题就不同了，有趣而且参 + 与者众多。 + +问：多年前的一次采访中你曾经说过：”谷歌与开源社区同行。赞助意味着责任，这是相当严肃的一件事情。“谷歌是否打算避免在自 +己参与的社区中担责，二者之间存在必然联系吗？ + +答： + 我想是这样的。我希望谷歌工程师和非谷歌开源界的工程师都能把对方看做计算机科学领域的同侪。 我们得意识到，对开源项 + 目的广泛资助预示着责任，比如项目控制，大家都知道，事情就应该这么做，即使真的没什么联系。 + +问：你曾经称开源”无情“,具体是什么意思? + +答： + 呃，我还以为你会问为什么开源可以行得通，什么时候会考虑开源软件工程管理在业内是如何运作，但是你没有。不同特性的团 +队在公司里的运作时及其不同的，但是在开源领域，可以创作出世界级的非常优秀的软件。为什么会这样？ + + 因为我认为，在开源项目中，你可以选择只和富有成效的人一起工作而忽视其他人。这种行为被理解为非常尖刻和排斥性的。 +然而实情原本就如此：无情并别排斥那些无所贡献的人。 + + 然而这就是为什么项目克隆如此重要。无论出于什么原因，如果一个人被排斥在一个项目之外，那么他们可以克隆该项目然后使 +该项目朝着不同的方向发展。假如他们的想法及实现优于先前被拒绝加入的项目，那么，好吧，这次克隆成为新的现实，而那些拒绝 +别的开发者加入的家伙现在则尝到了被拒绝的滋味。 + + 因此，我要说的是，开源世界里，实践出来的最合适的东西才会赢得生存的命运，这是相当无情的机制。但是这样行得通，可以 +开发出高质量的软件。诚然，对新手来说比较难上手…… + +问：14年前，你编辑过一本O'Reilly出版的有关开源的书。这些年开源领域是否了发生大的变化？你认为将来开源模式会取代专有模 +式吗？ + +答： + 开源界确实发生了一些变化，非常显著的一点就是公司里从事开源工作的人数的增长。而且我还觉察到学术界参与开源的人数有 +所下降，我把它归咎于技术转让专利申请，对代码许可权确实是个障碍。类似的，一些来自大学和公司的开源代码不足以称之为开源 +，因为围绕着专利要应付相当多的问题。我很想说要不是有专利授权许可，我们应该都持怀疑态度，但是在这个时候说这样的话就有 +可能走向极端了。 + +--- + +via: https://opensource.com/business/13/10/interview-chris-dibona + +本文由 [LCTT](https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject) 原创翻译，[Linux中国](http://linux.cn/) 荣誉推出 + +译者：[l3b2w1](https://github.com/l3b2w1) 校对：[校对者ID](https://github.com/校对者ID) From 78a3d8cfd09f85417fe6ea5d4d86a4fe00a545dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wxy Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 22:14:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] =?UTF-8?q?=E5=8F=91=E5=B8=83=EF=BC=9AThe=20Utilite=20?= =?UTF-8?q?Linux=20Mini=20PC?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit --- .../The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md | 15 ++++++--------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) rename {translated => published}/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md (69%) diff --git a/translated/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md b/published/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md similarity index 69% rename from translated/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md rename to published/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md index e2a03ef134..c234bb491b 100644 --- a/translated/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md +++ b/published/The Utilite Linux Mini PC.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ 屌丝专用！Linux迷你电脑 —— Utilite -================================================================================ +=========================== + 同学们好~ 除了完成日常工作，有时需要测试或使用某一个Linux发行版的时候，我们通常使用虚拟机，但这并不是最好的解决方案，你们是否听过Linux迷你电脑**Utilite**呢？ @@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ 对于正在寻找一款Linux迷你电脑，同时却囊中羞涩的同学来说，Utilite是一个非常棒的选择。这款设备由Compulab研发，Compulab同时还是MintBox的制造商。Mintbox就是一款运行Linux Mint操作系统的小型电脑盒子。基于ARM的Utilite售价仅为**99美刀**，性价比出色！ -**[Utilite][1]**标准版配置为**2G内存**、**4G存储容量**，支持micro-SD扩展卡。支持搭载Ubuntu或Android系统。如果你愿意，还可以购买升级版，**双核处理器**、**2G内存**、**8G存储**以及micro-SD扩展卡支持。这款设备是该公司第一款基于ARM模型的产品，采用Freescale的i.MX6系列处理器。在我看来，如果买不起昂贵的硬件，这是运行Ubuntu和其他GNU/Linux操作系统的最佳方法。 +**[Utilite][1]**标准版配置为**2G内存**、**4G存储容量**，支持micro-SD扩展卡。支持搭载Ubuntu或Android系统。如果你愿意，还可以购买升级版，**双核处理器**、**2G内存**、**8G存储** 以及micro-SD扩展卡支持。这款设备是该公司第一款基于ARM架构的产品，采用Freescale的i.MX6系列处理器。在我看来，如果买不起昂贵的硬件，这是运行Ubuntu和其他GNU/Linux操作系统的最佳方法。 Utilite有单核、双核、四核多个处理器方案，支持HDMI+DVI双接口，2倍Gbe千兆以太网，支持WiFi和蓝牙。除了标准版和升级版，Utilite还提供了专业版，配备四核处理器、2G内存、32G存储，下面是专业版的配置： @@ -18,7 +19,7 @@ Utilite有单核、双核、四核多个处理器方案，支持HDMI+DVI双接 - WiFi - Bluetooth -如配置中所示，这款迷你电脑还支持2倍千兆以太网，PDIF音频输出、立体声音频插孔和RS232系列端口。Utilite的另一个巨大优势是耗电量非常低，只有3-8瓦。 +如配置中所示，这款迷你电脑还支持2个千兆以太网，PDIF音频输出、立体声音频插孔和RS232系列端口。Utilite的另一个巨大优势是耗电量非常低，只有3-8瓦。 各位屌丝，买不起土豪金，要不来一个Utilite试试~？玩好了还可以推荐给你的女神哦~！ @@ -26,13 +27,9 @@ Utilite有单核、双核、四核多个处理器方案，支持HDMI+DVI双接 via: http://www.unixmen.com/utilite-linux-mini-pc/ -本文由 [LCTT][] 原创翻译，[Linux中国][] 荣誉推出 +本文由 [LCTT](https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject) 原创翻译，[Linux中国](http://linux.cn/) 荣誉推出 -译者：[Mr小眼儿][] 校对：[校对者ID][] +译者：[tinyeyeser](https://github.com/tinyeyeser) 校对：[wxy](https://github.com/wxy) -[LCTT]:https://github.com/LCTT/TranslateProject -[Linux中国]:http://linux.cn/portal.php -[Mr小眼儿]:http://linux.cn/space/14801 -[校对者ID]:http://linux.cn/space/校对者ID [1]:http://utilite-computer.com/web/home \ No newline at end of file